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Abstract		
	
High	international	oil	prices	in	the	mid‐2000s	drew	attention	again	to	biofuels,	which	then	
began	to	be	put	on	the	political	agendas	of	West	African	countries.	Arguments	advanced	in	their	
favor	pointed	 to	 the	potential	 to	 improve	access	of	populations	 to	 ready,	 cheap	energy	and	 to	
promote	economic	development.	Unsurprisingly,	energy	ministries	stepped	forward	to	establish	
biofuel	 policies,	 according	 little	 attention	 to	 the	 issues	 at	 stake	 for	 agricultural	 producers.	
Around	 the	 same	 time,	 increases	 in	 the	 price	 of	 food	 on	 the	 international	 market	 began	 to	
demonize	 biofuels,	 which	 then	 began	 to	 be	 perceived	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 food	 security	 of	
populations	 in	 developing	 countries.	 In	 several	 countries	 dependent	 on	 outside	 technical	 and	
financial	support,	this	shift	 in	the	international	discourse	influenced	the	position	of	agriculture	
ministries,	 which	 became	 lukewarm	 or	 even	 opposed	 to	 biofuels.	 Yet	 the	 question	 of	 rural	
development	could	have	drawn	the	two	sets	of	ministries	closer	together.	The	double	talk	at	the	
international	level	damaged	the	coordination	of	public	action	to	support	the	sector,	generated	an	
institutional	vacuum,	 led	to	conflicts	between	stakeholders,	and	hampered	the	development	of	
projects	and	sectors	in	West	African	countries.		
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Introduction	
	
Since	 the	 mid‐2000s,	 West	 African	
countries	 have	 sought	 to	 develop	 the	
production	 of	 biofuels	 (BFs)	 based	 on	
Jatropha	 curcas	 plants.	 This	 production	
responds	 to	 several	 challenges:	 energy	 self‐
sufficiency,	 income	 generation	 based	 on	 a	
new	 commercial	 crop,	 technological	 change,	
social	 advancement,	 rural	 development	 [4]	
[24].	 Negative	 social	 and	 environmental	
effects	of	 this	production	(taking	the	place	of	
staple	food	crops,	pressure	on	arable	land	and	
natural	 resources)	 have	 not	 been	widely	 felt	
in	this	region.	This	is	due	to	the	recent	drop	in	
oil	 prices	 on	 international	markets,	 which	 is	
undermining	 the	 viability	 of	 these	 projects,	
limiting	 the	 quantities	 produced,	 and	
throwing	 doubt	 on	 the	 sustainability	 of	 the	
sector	[1].		
Ten	 years	 after	 Jatropha	 was	 first	
planted,	 a	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 BF	
development	 in	 West	 African	 countries	
reveals	 diverse	 national	 trajectories.	What	 is	
most	 striking,	 however,	 is	 that	 the	
development	 of	 BFs	 in	 these	 countries	 has	
been	 hobbled	 by	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 clear	 and	
shared	 vision	 among	 stakeholders,	 in	
particular	 public	 actors,	 regarding	 the	
direction	to	give	this	sector.	Although	national	
BF	 strategies	have	been	 formulated,	 they	are	
not	 creating	 an	 institutional	 environment	
conducive	 to	 the	 stable	 development	 of	 this	
production.		
This	 article	 seeks	 to	 explain	 how	
clashing	 stakeholders’	 strategies,	 against	 a	
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backdrop	 of	 controversy	 over	 BFs,	 led	 to	
situations	where	coordinated	public	action	 is	
now	 absent,	 conflicts	 rage,	 and	 the	
development	 of	 BFs	 is	 blocked.	 It	 highlights	
the	 positions	 of	 different	 stakeholders	 and	
examines	 their	 interactions	 with	 the	 help	 of	
an	 analytic	 framework	 developed	 by	 the	
authors.	 The	 article	 is	 based	 on	 interviews	
conducted	 between	 the	 end	 of	 2011	 and	 the	
end	of	2014	with	sector	stakeholders	 in	 four	
West	African	 countries	 (Benin,	Burkina	Faso,	
Mali,	 Senegal)	 under	 the	 framework	 of	 a	
research	program	on	 the	BF	 sector	 (doctoral	
research	 supervised	 by	 2iE‐CIRAD	 and	
supported	by	 the	European	Union),	 and	on	a	
2014	 appraisal	 by	 CIRAD	 of	 bioenergy	
policies	 in	 West	 Africa	 (Iram	 –	 Hub	 Rural	
study).		
The	first	part	of	the	article	examines	the	
formulation	 of	 policies	 through	 the	
involvement	 of	 stakeholders,	 and	 uses	 the	
above	 mentioned	 framework	 to	 analyze	 the	
interplay	 of	 public	 and	 private	 actors.	 The	
second	 part	 focuses	 more	 closely	 on	 the	
question	of	political	leadership	and	the	causes	
and	effects	of	the	lack	of	coordination	among	
public	actors	in	West	Africa,	and	then	offers	a	
contextualized	 analysis	 of	 the	 situation	
mainly	in	Burkina	Faso.		
	
	
1. Incomplete	public	policies	
and	the	interplay	of	stakeholders	
	
The	development	of	BFs	 in	West	Africa	
experienced	a	boom	when	oil	prices	rocketed	
upwards	 in	 2007‐2008.	 Since	 that	 time,	
several	initiatives	have	been	launched	in	West	
African	 countries	 by	 private	 promoters,	who	
are	 accompanied	 and	 supervised	 to	 varying	
degrees	by	policies	and	strategies	formulated	
for	the	development	of	the	sector.	An	analysis	
of	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 sector	 and	 the	
development	 of	 public	 policy	 reveals	 diverse	
sets	 of	 stakeholders.	 First,	 we	 analyze	 the	
position	 and	 level	 of	 involvement	 of	 these	
stakeholders.	 We	 then	 look	 at	 the	 nature	 of	
the	 relationships	 between	 the	 main	
stakeholders	 in	 the	 sector	 in	 four	 countries.	
These	 countries	 were	 chosen	 due	 to	 the	
interest	donors	have	taken	in	them,	as	well	as	
to	 understand	 how	 countries	 which	 at	 one	
time	 shared	 a	 fairly	 similar	 vision	 (pro	 BF	
rhetoric	 particularly	 in	 Senegal,	 Benin	 and	
Mali)	 could	 follow	 such	 different	 BF	
development	trajectories.	
	
1.1.	 The	 involvement	 of	 stakeholders	
in	building	BF	policies	 in	four	West	African	
countries	
	
The	 development	 of	 BF	 policies	 took	
place	 in	 a	 multi‐stakeholder	 context	 (public,	
private,	 local,	 national,	 foreign,	
international…),	 with	 the	 involvement	 of	
these	 actors	 fluctuating	 during	 different	
stages	 of	 the	 policymaking	 process.	 	 We	
propose	 to	 use	 policy	 cycle	 stages	 [19]	 to	
analyze	 the	 interactions	 and	 level	 of	
involvement	of	stakeholders	(Figure	1).	While	
this	sequential	vision	has	its	limits,	as	several	
stages	may	 overlap	 or	 be	 superimposed	 one	
over	 another	 [23],	 this	 cycle	 seems	
appropriate	means	to	analyze	and	understand	
how	public	policy	 is	 formulated.	The	analytic	
breakdown	 renders	 it	 possible	 to	 isolate	 key	
moments	in	the	policy	making	process	and	to	
concentrate	 on	 the	 interactions	 between	
various	 stakeholders	 in	 each	 stage.	We	 focus	
in	 particular	 on	 the	 first	 four	 stages:	
emergence	 and	 identification	 of	 a	 problem,	
agenda	 setting,	 policy	 formulation	 and	
adoption,	and	policy	implementation.		
	
	
Figure	1:	the	stages	of	a	public	policy	cycle	
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Emergence	 and	 identification	 of	 a	
problem	
The	 high	 cost	 of	 energy	 resulting	 from	
dwindling	 oil	 resources	 was	 the	 main	 factor	
behind	 rekindled1	 global	 interest	 in	 BFs.	 BF	
production	 appeared	 to	 be	 an	 alternative	
solution	 to	 a	 societal	 problem	 of	 access	 to	
cheap	energy.	Against	the	backdrop	of	the	oil	
crisis	 (with	 oil	 prices	 reaching	 US$140	 per	
barrel	 in	 June	 2008),	 questions	 related	 to	
energy	 dependence,	 availability	 of	 fuel	 for	
consumers,	 and	 trade	 balances	 arose	 starkly	
in	both	the	North	and	South.	The	high	cost	of	
oil	motivated	industrial	countries	to	stimulate	
the	 production	 of	 biodiesel	 and	 bioethanol	
particularly	 for	 use	 in	 the	 transportation	
industry.	Some	developing	countries	saw	BFs	
as	 an	 opportunity	 to	 both	 reduce	 energy	
dependence	 and	 boost	 their	 economic	
development.			
	
Political	agenda	setting	
In	 West	 Africa,	 the	 sector	 has	 been	
developed	 and	 policies	 formulated	 through	
two	 channels	 at	 different	 levels:	 at	 the	
national	 level	 via	 numerous	 direct	 private	
initiatives,	and	at	the	regional	level	under	the	
impetus	of	public	actors.		
The	 first	 initiatives	 were	 made	 by	
foreign	or	national	promoters	in	the	countries	
concerned.	To	increase	the	supply	of	BFs	and	
better	respond	to	national	European	markets,	
Directive	 2003/30/EC	 on	 the	 promotion	 of	
BFs	 encouraged	 European	 promoters	 (NGOs	
and	 multinationals)	 to	 launch	 several	 BF	
projects	 in	Africa.	These	 initiatives	 sought	 to	
cultivate	 Jatropha	with	 the	 idea	 of	 exporting	
the	 seeds	 to	 Europe	 where	 they	 would	 be	
transformed	into	biodiesel.		
In	 parallel	 to	 these	 private,	 mainly	
European	initiatives	(there	also	were	Chinese	
and	 American	 bioethanol	 projects),	 public‐
sector	 actors	 in	 Europe	 (the	 European	
Commission	 through	 the	 European	
Development	 Fund,	 Dutch	 and	 German	
cooperation	 agencies)	 and	 Brazil	 influenced	
the	 initiatives	 of	 West	 African	 actors	 by	
funding	 pilot	 projects	 aiming	 to	 satisfy	 both	
international	and	domestic	markets,	research	
                                                            
1	Industrialized	countries	previously	were	interested	in	
BFs	during	the	2nd	oil	shock	of	1979.	
programs,	 and	 meetings	 between	 decision	
makers	 (UEMOA2/ECOWAS3	 Summit,	 and	
Brazil	organized	study	trips	to	the	country	for	
UEMOA	 officials	 and	 representatives	 of	
farmers	organizations).			
These	 initiatives	 were	 largely	 put	
through	 at	 the	 regional	 level,	 with	 UEMOA	
playing	 a	 leading	 role	 in	 attracting	 funding	
and	 transferring	 ideas.	 It	 was	 the	 main	
interface	 used	 by	 foreign	 donors	 to	 fund	
regional	 and	 national	 BF	 projects	 and	
programs.	 The	 Regional	 Biomass‐Energy	
Program	 (RBEP),	 launched	 in	 2004	 with	
Dutch	funding	(€2.5	million)	and	composed	of	
two	3‐year	phases,	is	a	reflection	of	the	strong	
regional	 political	 will	 to	 promote	 biomass‐
energy.	 The	 program	 financed	 studies4	 and	
expert	 assessments	 to	 develop	 national	
strategy	 documents,	 but	 did	 not	 have	 the	
resources	 to	 implement	 significant	 actions	
within	 the	 countries.	 With	 regard	 to	 Brazil,	
UEMOA	 sought	 to	 capture	 funding	 for	 the	
implementation	 of	 regional	 and	 national	 BF	
initiatives	based	on	the	Brazilian	model	of	the	
sector	 by	 signing	 a	 memorandum	 of	
understanding	with	the	country	in	2007.	This	
reflected	 the	 leading	 role	 Brazil	 wished	 to	
play	 in	 this	 field	 in	 West	 Africa.	 However,	
eight	 years	 later,	 few	 concrete	 actions	 have	
been	 implemented,	 and	only	a	 few	 feasibility	
studies	 have	 been	 launched	 with	 funding	
from	the	Brazilian	Cooperation	Agency	(ABC)	
and	 the	 Brazilian	 Development	 Bank	
(BNDES).		
Together,	 these	 initiatives	 influenced	
the	manner	by	which	the	political	agenda	was	
set	 in	 each	 country.	 In	 Benin,	 the	 question	
emerged	 fairly	 rapidly	 under	 the	 impetus	 of	
the	 country’s	 president	 following	 his	 visit	 to	
Brazil	in	2007.	The	government	then	initiated	
and	supported	the	establishment	of	a	protocol	
of	 understanding	 between	 the	 two	 countries	
                                                            
2	West	African	Economic	and	Monetary	Union,	known	
by	its	French	acronym,	UEMOA	(Union	économique	et	
monétaire	ouest‐africaine).	
3	Economic	Community	of	West	African	States.	
4	 For	 example:	 the	 regional	 feasibility	 study	 on	 setting	
up	 biomass	 brick	 factories	 and	 carbonized	 biomass	
charcoal	 as	 alternative	 fuel,	 the	 study	of	 establishing	 a	
regional	 biomass	 energy	 data	 base,	 the	 study	 of	 the	
development	 of	 the	 “ethanol	 /	 gel	 fuel”	 sector	 for	
cooking	fuel	in	the	UEMOA	area. 
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and	the	setting	up	of	a	committee	to	monitor	
the	implementation	of	BF	initiatives.			
In	 Burkina	 Faso,	 the	 issue	 emerged	
gradually	 and	 took	 several	 forms	 under	 the	
influence	of	three	key	individuals:	a	technical	
adviser	 who	 influenced	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Energy,	 a	 research	 scientist	 who	 studied	
Jatropha	 during	 the	 1980s,	 and	 a	 highly	
influential	 politician/traditional	 chief	 with	
extensive	 political	 and	 media	 contacts	 who	
promoted	Jatropha‐based	BFs	and	invested	in	
the	sector	on	his	own	behalf	(see	below).	
In	 Mali,	 the	 emergence	 process	 was	
similar	 to	 that	 of	 Burkina	 Faso	 with	 the	
involvement	 of	 a	 large	 number	 of	 actors:	
NGOs,	 multinationals,	 cooperation	 agencies	
(SNV	 and	 GTZ	 which	 launched	 a	 bioenergy	
project	in	the	1980s).		
In	Senegal,	emergence	was	gradual	and	
driven	as	in	Benin	by	the	country’s	president	
following	the	reciprocal	visits	of	the	Brazilian	
President	 to	 Senegal	 in	 2005	 and	 the	
Senegalese	President	to	Brazil	in	2007.	These	
visits	 reinforced	 the	 determination	 of	 the	
government,	 which	 created	 a	 BF	 ministry	 in	
2007.		
	
Policy	formulation	and	adoption		
The	 emergence	 of	 BFs	 in	 the	 political	
sphere	 led	 to	 the	 production	 of	 a	 certain	
number	 of	 policy	 documents	which	 involved	
public	 sector	 actors	 in	 different	ways	 (Table	
1).	 In	 Benin	 and	 Burkina	 Faso,	 only	
framework	 documents	 outlining	 the	 vision	
and	 strategy	 exist.	 Benin	 developed	 a	
“Strategy	 for	 the	 promotion	 of	 the	 biofuel	
sector"	 following	 a	 relatively	 long	 process	
begun	 in	2006	under	 the	 coordination	of	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Energy	 which	 mobilized	 to	 a	
lesser	degree	 the	Ministry	of	Agriculture,	 the	
Ministry	of	Trade,	 the	office	of	 the	President,	
the	oil	industry,	and	diverse	consultants.	This	
text	was	finally	adopted	by	the	government	in	
2011.	In	Burkina	Faso,	the	strategy	developed	
by	the	Ministry	of	Energy	in	2009,	named	the	
“Framework	document	 for	biofuel	promotion	
policy",	 has	 yet	 to	 be	 adopted	 by	 the	
government.			
In	 Mali	 and	 Senegal,	 the	 political	 and	
regulatory	 framework	 is	 slightly	 more	
developed.	 In	Mali,	 the	“National	Strategy	 for	
Biofuel	 Development”	 was	 adopted	 by	 the	
government	 in	 2008	 and	 the	 regulatory	
framework	 drafted	 in	 2011	 is	 pending	
adoption.	 Both	 documents	 were	 drawn	 up	
under	 the	 coordination	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Energy	with	 contributions	 from	 other	 actors	
(see	 below).	 In	 Senegal,	 the	 biofuel	 law	
adopted	 by	 the	 government	 and	 National	
Assembly	 in	 2010,	 and	 the	 regulatory	
framework	 drafted	 in	 2012	 still	 pending	
adoption,	were	both	drawn	up	by	the	Ministry	
of	 Biofuels,	 which	 was	 established	 in	 2006	
under	 the	 impetus	 of	 the	 President	 of	 the	
Republic.		
	
Implementation		
The	implementation	of	these	BF	policies	
has	 been	 limited	 due	 to	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	
international	debate	on	BFs.	Following	sharp	
increases	in	agricultural	product	prices	on	the	
international	 market	 beginning	 in	 2008,	
voices	 accusing	 BFs	 of	 affecting	 food	 prices	
(food	 riots),	 land	 grabbing,	 and	 ultimately	
food	 security	 in	poor	 countries	have	become	
louder.	 Two	 opposing	 views	 of	 BFs	 have	
emerged,	with	supporters,	who	view	BFs	as	a	
source	of	development	based	on	better	access	
to	energy,	pitted	against	critics,	who	point	 to	
the	 numerous	 risks	 posed	 by	 BFs	 for	 local	
populations.	
This	 evolution	 of	 the	 international	
debate	 led	 numerous	 export	 projects	 to	
abandon	 or	 lower	 their	 objectives.	 Senegal	
changed	 its	 strategy,	 which	 initially	 was	
oriented	 around	 seed	 exports,	 to	 focus	 on	
producing	 for	 the	 national	 market.	 In	 Benin	
and	 Burkina	 Faso,	 all	 public	 initiatives	 to	
facilitate	 the	 structuring	 of	 the	 sector	 by	
defining	 an	 incentive‐based	 regulatory	
framework	 appear	 to	 be	 frozen.	 In	 contrast,	
the	 policy	 implementation	 process	 in	 Mali	
was	more	effective	due	to	the	activities	of	the	
Agence	 Nationale	 de	 Développement	 des	
Biocarburants	(ANADEB,	the	national	biofuels	
development	agency),	created	in	2009.		
Nearly	one	decade	after	 the	emergence	
of	BFs	 in	 these	 four	 countries,	 the	BF	 sector,	
like	elsewhere	in	Africa	[21],	is	developing	in	
an	 uncertain	 environment.5	 Public	 initiatives	
                                                            
5	 The	 same	 shortfalls	 have	 been	 noted	 elsewhere	 in	
Africa.	 Many	 failures	 in	 bioenergy	 development	 and	
hesitation	on	the	part	of	 investors	 in	most	East	African	
countries	 were	 due	 to	 the	 absence	 of	 policies	 which	
were	realistic	(acknowledge	the	reality	of	agriculture	in	
the	 country),	 stable	 and	 target	 long	 term	 and	
sustainable	actions	[22].		
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abound,	 but	 many	 policy	 documents	 are	
incomplete,	 or	 are	 waiting	 to	 be	 adopted	 or	
implemented.	 Programs	 are	 at	 times	
suspended,	their	goals	unclear.	There	thus	is	a	
marked	discrepancy	between	the	stated	goals	
(Table	 1)	 and	 the	 resources	 actually	
employed.	The	regulatory	framework	in	some	
countries	is	rarely	complete	and	the	different	
measures	 considered	 to	 be	 critical	 by	
stakeholders	in	the	sector	are	on	hold,	leading	
to	 a	 true	 institutional	 vacuum.	 However,	 a	
regulatory	 framework	 to	 promote	 both	 the	
production	 and	 use	 of	 BFs	 (incentives,	
information	 to	 users,	 etc.)	 is	 desperately	
needed.	This	need	is	felt	particularly	strongly	
with	 regard	 to	 the	 choice	 of	where	 to	 locate	
crops,	 land	 access	 and	 use,	 support	 for	
investment,	 setting	 up	 and	 monitoring	
product	 standards,	 price	 controls,	 etc.	 This	
institutional	 vacuum	 leads	 to	 ambiguity	
which	 penalizes	 the	 development	 of	 the	 BF	
sector	in	these	countries.		
In	most	of	the	countries	studied,	private	
stakeholders	 blame	 politicians	 for	 the	
absence	 of	 a	 regulatory,	 legislative	 and	
financial	 incentive	 framework	supporting	the	
development	of	BFs.	Only	Mali	seems	to	have	
become	engaged	in	the	development	of	a	real	
institutional	 framework,	 the	establishment	of	
regulatory	 and	 fiscal	 tools,	 and	 the	
implementation	 of	 a	 strategy	 document.	 The	
failure	 to	 develop	 a	 policy	 and	 institutional	
framework	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 main	 obstacle	
impeding	the	development	of	the	sector.	
In	 the	 absence	 of	 government	 support,	
the	promotion	of	BFs	relies	on	the	activities	of	
private	operators	and	the	partnerships	which	
they	are	able	to	develop	between	each	other,	
whether	 with	 private	 foreign	 firms	 (mainly	
Chinese	 and	 Italian)	 or	 with	 NGOs.	 The	
private	 sector	 has	 mobilized	 to	 develop	 BFs	
through	numerous	projects.		
However,	 the	countries	did	 try	 to	build	
public‐private	 partnerships	 as	 a	 means	 to	
develop	 confidence	 between	 multiple	
stakeholders	 involved	 with	 BFs,	 overcome	
various	 challenges	 faced	 by	 the	 sector,	
develop	 collective	 responsibility,	 and	 share	
risks.	While	such	a	partnership	appears	to	be	
operational	 in	 Mali	 under	 the	 impetus	 of	
ANADEB,	 it	 is	 not	 always	 easy	 to	 build	 in	
countries	 where	 political	 leaders	 are	
unsuccessful	 in	 generating	 private	 initiatives	
(for	 example,	 Senegal)	 or	 in	 countries	where	
private	 operators	 lack	 government	 support	
(for	example,	Burkina	Faso).		
	
1.2.	Use	of	the	“4C”	approach	to	
analyze	the	relationships	between	
stakeholders	
	
The	 level	 of	 involvement	 and	 the	
interactions	 of	 public	 and	 private	
stakeholders	 differ	 from	 country	 to	 country,	
and	 this	 influences	 the	 policy	 development	
and	 sector	 building	 processes	 in	 each.	 The	
following	 analysis	 enables	 the	 interactions	
between	 stakeholders	 in	 each	 country	 to	 be	
mapped	 out	 and	 compared.	 Partnerships	
between	 stakeholders	 appear	 to	 offer	 the	
advantage	of	conciliating	the	interests	of	most	
of	 the	 stakeholders	 involved.	 We	 seek	 to	
estimate	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 partnerships	
between	 stakeholders	 and	 examine	 how	 this	
may	explain	the	institutional	configuration	in	
each	 country.	 To	 this	 end,	 we	 developed	 an	
analytic	 framework	 (the	 “4Cs”)	which	breaks	
down	the	interplay	between	stakeholders	into	
four	 types	 of	 relationships:	 coordination,	
concertation,	 contractualization,	 and	
cooperation.		
	
“Coordination”	of	public	action	
We	 identified	 coordination	 between	
public	 actors	 (central	 government,	 territorial	
authorities…)	 as	 the	 first	 important	
relationship	between	stakeholders.			
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Table	1:	BF	public	policies	in	Benin,	Burkina	Faso,	Mali,	and	Senegal	
Benin	 Burkina	Faso	 Mali	 Senegal	
Energy	and	
renewable	
energies	policy	
Policy	and	energy	
strategy	2003	 	
No	policy	but	a	domestic	
energy	strategy	in	2005	 National	policy	2006	 	 Energy	policies	1997,	2003,	2008		
BF	policy	and	
regulatory	texts	
BF	policy	2008	
BF	orientation	law	
2011	
Not	established	
Regulatory	framework	
defined	in	2011	
Biodiesel,	bioethanol	and	PPO	
standards	defined	in	2013		
BF	special	project	2007‐2012
BF	law	2010		
Regulatory	framework	drafted	in	2012	not	
adopted		
National	strategy	
and	goals		 National	strategy	2011		
BF	promotion	policy	
framework	document	
drafted	in	2009	but	not	
adopted	
National	BF	development	
strategy	in	2008		 	 National	export	oriented	strategy	2009	
Objective/market	
targeted	
Mainly	export	and	
national	market	
National	market	in	
priority		 National	market		 Export	and	national	market	
Ambitions/stated	
objectives		
Substitution	rate	at	the	
national	level	to	move	
from	1.25%	in	2015,		to	
6.25%	in	2020	and	to	
10%	from	2025	
Gradually	substitute	up	
to	30%	of	diesel	used	for	
transport	by	2020	
Substitution	rate	of	diesel	or	
DDO	by	JC	oil:	2008	–	2013	:	
10%	2014	–	2018	:	15%	2018	
–	2023	:	20%	25	million	liters	
of	ethanol/year	over	the	
period	
Quantified	objectives	for	the	period	2007‐
2012:		
(a)	1	190	million	liters	of	oil		
(b)	1	134	million		liters	of	oil	or	biodiesel		
(c)	Plant	321	000	hectares	of	land,	calculated	
as	1	000	ha	per	rural	community		
Private	actors	
involved	in	20146	 2	 13	 10	 5	
		PPO:	pure	plant	oil		‐		JC:	Jatropha	Curcas		–		DDO:	distillated	diesel	oil
                                                            
6	See	[10]	for	a	detailed	presentation	of	the	various	private	actors	involved.		
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The	importance	of	this	relationship	was	
demonstrated	by	numerous	authors	[14]	[15]	
[16]	 [25]	 and	 was	 defined	 as	 the	 preferred	
mode	 of	 action	 in	 the	 governance	 of	 the	
bioenergy	sector	 in	France.	The	coordination	
of	 public	 action	 is	 essential	 when	 a	
multisectoral	issue	like	that	of	BFs	is	involved.	
It	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 prerequisite	 for	 the	
establishment	 of	 sustainable	 value	 chains	
responding	to	several	sectoral	interests.		
The	coordination	of	public	action	varied	
across	 the	 countries	 studied.	 In	 Mali,	 it	 was	
present	 from	 the	 very	 beginning	 and	
facilitated	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 national	
strategy	 in	 2008	 before	 ANADEB	 had	 even	
been	 established.	 In	 Senegal,	 it	 initially	 was	
formalized	with	 the	 creation	 of	 a	ministry	 in	
charge	 of	 BFs	 composed	 of	 officials	 drawn	
from	 other	 ministries.	 Since	 the	 BF	
department	was	placed	under	the	Ministry	of	
Energy	 and	 Renewable	 Energy	 Development	
in	 2012,	 no	 visible	 joint	 ministry	 action	 has	
been	 taken.	 The	 situations	 in	 Benin	 and	
Burkina	Faso	also	are	 characterized	by	weak	
coordination	 between	 public	 actors,	 notably	
between	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 Ministries	 of	
Energy	 and	 the	 Ministries	 of	 Agriculture.	 In	
each	 of	 these	 two	 countries,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	
arbitrate	 between	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Energy’s	
focus	 on	 energy	 access	 and	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Agriculture’s	 concern	 for	 food	 security.	 In	
Benin,	 this	 situation	 led	 to	 a	 divisive	 debate	
between	 the	 two	 ministries	 over	 granting	
approval	 to	 a	 Chinese	 multinational	 seeking	
to	 produce	 bioethanol	 from	 cassava	 (see	
below).		
The	lack	of	coordination	in	the	political	
sphere	 in	 each	 country	 aside	 from	Mali,	 and	
the	tension	over	the	orientation	to	be	given	to	
the	 sector	 in	 the	 three	 other	 countries,	 is	
reducing	 the	 influence	and	capacity	of	public	
sector	actors	to	build	a	policy,	regulatory,	and	
incentive	 framework.	 This	 situation	 thus	
hinders	 the	 construction	 of	 an	 institutional	
landscape	 conducive	 to	 the	 development	 of	
the	sector.		
	
“Concertation”	 between	 public	 and	
private	partners		
This	 is	 the	 second	 relationship	 to	
prioritize	in	each	country.	Several	authors	[7]	
[26]	have	shown	that	concertation	is	required	
to	 improve	 the	 management	 of	 agricultural	
development.	 It	 can	 be	 developed	 through	
exchange	 platforms,	 agencies	 or	 units	
dedicated	 to	 BFs	 as	 long	 as	 these	 are	
operational.	Such	platforms	were	set	up	in	all	
four	 countries	 with	 varying	 degrees	 of	
influence	 in	 each.	 In	 Benin,	 the	 Commission	
nationale	 de	 promotion	 des	 biocarburants	
(CNPB,	 the	 national	 commission	 for	
promoting	 BFs)	 was	 created	 in	 2008;	 in	
Burkina	 Faso,	 the	 Comité	 interministériel	
chargé	 de	 la	 coordination	 des	 activités	 de	
développement	 des	 filières	 biocarburants	
(CICAFIB,	 an	 inter‐ministerial	 committee	
responsible	 for	 the	 development	 of	 the	 BF	
sector)	also	was	created	 in	2008;	 in	Mali,	 the	
Agence	 nationale	 de	 développement	 des	
biocarburants	 (ANADEB,	 the	 national	 BF	
development	 agency)	 was	 set	 up	 in	 2009,	
followed	 by	 the	 Commission	 nationale	
biocarburant	 (CNB,	 the	 national	 BF	
commission)	 in	 2011;	 and	 finally	 in	 Senegal,	
the	Comité	national	des	biocarburants	(CNB,	a	
national	BF	committee)	was	created	 in	2010.	
However,	 these	 platforms	 for	 concerted	
action	 have	 barely	 functioned	 and	 have	 not	
yet	managed	 to	 connect	 essential	 public	 and	
private	partners,	nor	have	they	facilitated	the	
exchanges	required	 for	 the	definition	of	a	BF	
policy	 and	 the	 structuring	 of	 the	 sector.	 In	
Burkina	 Faso,	 the	 CICAFIB	 has	 only	met	 five	
times.	 No	 activity	 has	 been	 developed	 by	
either	CNPB	in	Benin	or	CNB	in	Senegal.	Only	
ANADEB	 has	 been	 able	 to	 play	 an	 effective	
role	 by	 holding	 regular	 meetings	 between	
public	 and	 private	 actors	 and	 farmers.	
Depending	on	a	given	subject,	ANADEB	brings	
together	government	 technical	 services,	 local	
authorities	 (named	 Cercles),	 project	
promoters	 of	 different	 sizes,	 producer	
organizations	(notably	CNOP7),	the	University	
of	Bamako,	 research	 institutions	such	as	 IER,	
professional	 training	 schools,	 laboratories,	
and	 consumer	 associations.	 ANADEB	 is	 a	
forum	 for	 exchange	 where	 experience	 and	
expertise	 on	 BFs	 is	 gradually	 being	 forged.	
One	 example	 of	 its	 effectiveness	 is	 the	
publication	of	BF	standards	in	2013.	ANADEB	
facilitated	 the	 structuring	 of	 the	 sector	 by	
establishing	 a	 multi‐stakeholder	 and	 multi‐
sectoral	partnership	which	renders	it	possible	
to	 conciliate	 the	 interests	 and	 visions	 of	
                                                            
7	A	national	confederation	of	farmer	organizations.		
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different	 stakeholders	 in	 order	 to	 build	 a	
more	integrated	sector	which	responds	to	the	
needs	of	the	majority	of	the	actors	involved.		
		
“Contractualization”	 of	 relations	
between	private	actors	in	the	sector	
The	 coordination	 of	 activities	 between	
stakeholders	 operating	 at	 different	 points	
along	 a	 value	 chain	 also	 seems	 important	 to	
consider.	 Several	 authors	 [13]	 [17]	 [18]	 [26]	
[20]	 have	 shown	 the	 benefits	 of	
contractualization	 as	 a	 means	 to	 vertically	
coordinate	 actors	 in	 the	 agriculture	 sector	
and	 as	 a	 component	 of	 efficiency	 in	 market	
development.	With	regard	to	supplying	the	BF	
sector,	 [2]	 [12]	 have	 highlighted	 the	
contractualization	 of	 relations	 between	
farmers	 and	 project	 promoters	 as	 a	
prerequisite	 to	 ensuring	 the	 sustainability	 of	
supply	 while	 preserving	 family	 agriculture	
[12].	 Contractualization	 mainly	 was	
established	 in	 the	 countries	 studied	 by	 the	
promoters	of	projects	involving	the	industrial	
production	of	oil	 or	biodiesel	using	 Jatropha,	
which	requires	vast	quantities	of	seeds	for	the	
processing	 units	 to	 function.	 To	 ensure	
supplies,	 project	 promoters	 established	
Jatropha	seed	purchase	contracts	with	farmer	
organizations.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 strategy	
followed	 by	 promoters	 of	 bioethanol	
production	 projects,	 notably	 in	 Benin	 and	
Senegal,	 was	 to	 produce	 sugar	 cane	
themselves	on	their	own	fields.		
	
“Cooperation”	 between	 foreign	 actors	
and	national	public	and	private	actors		
This	 is	 the	 fourth	 important	
relationship	 that	 we	 identified.	 Bilateral	 and	
multilateral	 cooperation	 allows	 investments	
to	be	 channeled	 towards	 the	development	of	
the	 sector	 [6]	 [8].	 Cooperation	 can	 take	
several	 forms,	 such	 as	 carbon	 finance	
activities	or	rural	development	support.		
In	 terms	 of	 multinational	 cooperation,	
the	 Jatropha	 programs	 initiated	 by	 UNDP	 in	
Burkina	 Faso	 and	 Mali	 promote	 the	 use	 of	
vegetable	 oil	 in	 a	 network	 of	multifunctional	
platforms.8	 The	 World	 Bank,	 through	 its	
                                                            
8	 A	multifunctional	 platform	 is	 equipped	with	 a	 diesel	
engine	able	to	power	different	machinery,	for	example,	a	
mill	to	grind	grains,	a	husker,	or	a	battery	charger.	The	
engine	 also	 can	 generate	 electricity	 for	 lighting	 and	
refrigeration	and	to	pump	water.		
	
Program	For	Scaling	Up	Renewable	Energy	 in	
Mali,	 which	 was	 launched	 in	 2010	 and	
includes	 a	 biomass	 component,	 funds	
initiatives	 related	 to	 decentralized	 rural	
electrification	 (DRE),	 environmental	
protection,	 and	 the	mitigation	 of	 greenhouse	
gas	emissions.	The	European	Union	(EU)	first	
funded	 pilot	 production	 projects	 in	 Senegal,	
Mali,	and	Burkina	Faso	through	the	RBEP	(see	
above),	 then	 the	 2iE/EIFER/CIRAD	
“Valorisation	 énergétique	 de	 la	 biomasse	 en	
Afrique	 de	 l’Ouest”(Development	 of	 biomass	
energy	in	West	Africa)	research	program.		
Bilateral	cooperation	has	taken	place	at	
various	 levels	 and	 in	 different	 forms.	 The	
Brazilian	 strategy	 consisted	 of	 channeling	
funds	 through	 the	 Brazilian	 Cooperation	
Agency	(ABC)	and	the	Brazilian	Development	
Bank	 (BNDES)	 for	 many	 studies	 and	
assessments	of	the	feasibility	of	BF	sectors	in	
numerous	 UEMOA	 countries	 (see	 above).	
Cooperation	 also	 can	 take	 the	 form	 of	
technology	transfers	such	as	Taiwan’s	funding	
of	 Jatropha	 seed	 crushing	 and	 processing	
equipment	 for	 three	 promoters9	 in	 Burkina	
Faso	 in	 2012	 (through	 the	 International	
Cooperation	 and	 Development	 Fund).	
Another	means	of	action	was	 to	 facilitate	 the	
installation	 of	 multinationals	 in	 these	
countries	 through	 public	 cooperation	
agencies	 which	 negotiate	 with	 national	
authorities.	This	was	the	case	in	Benin,	where	
the	Chinese	state	enterprise	Complant	 (China	
National	 Complete	 Plant	 Import	 &	 Export	
Corporation)	 acquired	 the	 sugar	 company	
Savé	 and	 supported	 the	 installation	 of	 the	
multinational	 company,	 Zheng	 Da	
Investments	 Limited,	 which	 hopes	 to	 obtain	
land	 to	 produce	 cassava‐based	 bioethanol.	
Cooperation	 agencies	 also	 can	 become	
involved	 by	 directly	 providing	 loans	 to	
finance	 the	 industrial	 investment	 plans	 of	
private	actors.	This	was	the	case,	for	example,	
of	 the	 French	 Development	 Agency	 (AFD),	
which	awarded	a	loan	to	an	industrial	actor	in	
Mali	 (Jatropha	 Mali	 initiative)	 in	 2011.	 The	
German	 (GIZ)	 and	 Dutch	 (SNV)	 cooperation	
agencies	 also	 contributed	 to	 developing	 the	
sector	by	 funding	 local	 efforts	 to	produce	oil	
                                                            
9	Two	 industrial	biodiesel	production	units	using	 JC	oil	
were	 given	 to	 BelwetBiocarburant	 and	
FasoBiocarburant	 SA	 and	 an	 oilseed	 press	 for	 the	
production	of	PPO	to	Aprojer.			
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for	 socio‐economic	 activities	 and	
decentralized	 rural	 electrification	 (DRE)	
units.	 We	 should	 note	 that	 the	 German	
cooperation	 agency	 was	 the	 first	 to	 fund	
renewable	energy	and	BF	(PPO)	development	
projects	 in	 Mali	 and	 Burkina	 Faso	 in	 the	
1970s	and	80s.		
While	it	may	seem	simplistic	to	present	
complex	 institutional	 situations	 using	 the	
“4Cs”	 framework,	 the	 tool	 allows	 an	
examination	of	the	four	types	of	relationships	
which	we	believe	to	be	decisive	 in	setting	up	
sustainable	sectors.		
	
	
2. Leadership	and	
coordination	of	public	action	in	the	
West	African	biofuel	sector		
	
The	 coordination	 of	 public	 actions	 is	
indispensable	for	public	policy	processes	and	
national	 governance	 [14].	 It	 furthermore	
conditions	 other	 forms	 of	 relationships	
because	 coordinated	 state	 action	 provides	
governments	 with	 the	 means	 to	 incite	 and	
involve	 other	 actors	 [19].	 In	 terms	 of	 the	
multisectoral	 specificity	 of	 BFs,	 coordination	
is	 particularly	 critical	 when	 several	
government	 ministries	 are	 arguing	 over	
which	 one	 should	 assume	 leadership	 on	 the	
issue.	To	better	understand	the	issues	at	stake	
in	 the	 coordination	 of	 public	 action,	 in	 the	
next	 two	 sub‐sections	 we	 analyze	 the	 plays	
for	 influence	 and	 jostling	 for	 leadership	 on	
the	 BFs	 question	 between	 energy	 and	
agriculture	 ministries.	 We	 then	 look	 at	 the	
special	 features	 of	 the	 Burkina	 Faso	 case	 to	
probe	 more	 deeply	 into	 the	 causes	 and	
consequences	 of	 the	 power	 games	 between	
these	two	players.	We	find	that	the	evolution	
of	 the	 international	 debate	 on	 BFs	 had	 an	
important	influence	on	the	positions	taken	by	
actors,	 the	 emergence	 of	 divisive	 situations,	
and	the	malfunctioning	of	the	sector.	
	
2.1.	The	domination	of	energy	
ministries	on	the	multisectoral	biofuel	
question		
	
In	the	public	decision	making	ring,	each	
ministry	 seeks	 to	 promote	 its	 own	 sectoral	
interests	 within	 power	 struggles	 for	
leadership.	The	outcome	of	the	confrontation	
of	 various	 ministries’	 views	 and	 discourses	
helps	build	a	 sector’s	policy	and	 institutional	
framework	 and	 influences	 the	 orientations	
and	 choices	 of	 different	 stakeholders	 in	 the	
sector.		
In	 the	 four	 countries	 studied,	 one	 can	
see	that	the	ministries	in	charge	of	energy	are	
imposing	 their	 views	 of	 the	 development	 of	
the	sector	to	the	detriment	of	the	views	of	the	
ministries	of	agriculture,	which	represent	the	
interests	 of	 agricultural	 producers.	 Indeed,	
the	BF	policies	which	have	been	implemented	
unanimously	focus	on	improving	the	access	of	
populations	 (in	particular	 rural)	 to	energy	 in	
order	 to	drive	development,	 in	 contrast	with	
the	 objectives	 governing	 these	 policies	
elsewhere	 in	 the	 world.10	 The	 political	
arguments	 which	 prevailed	 did	 not	 focus	 on	
stimulating	 a	 production	 or	 an	 agricultural	
sector	 by	 ensuring	 an	 outlet,	 but	 rather	 on	
developing	 energy	 services	 by	 supplying	 the	
necessary	raw	materials.	The	approach	based	
on	 a	 finished	 product	 (PPO,	 bioethanol	 or	
diesel)	 for	 rural	 energy	 services	 enabled	
energy	 ministries	 to	 position	 themselves	 as	
leaders	 on	 the	 question	 and	 to	 impose	 their	
views	 within	 their	 governments	 with	 a	
somewhat	 muted	 involvement	 of	 other	
ministries,	notably	agriculture.		
With	 the	 exception	 of	 Mali,	 where	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Agriculture	 has	 played	 a	 major	
decision	 making	 role	 through	 its	
decentralized	 structures	 (notably	 the	 choice	
of	Jatropha	based	on	information	provided	by	
agricultural	 research	 and	 the	 choice	 of	 short	
marketing	 chains),	 the	 agriculture	ministries	
in	 Benin,	 Burkina	 Faso	 and	 Senegal	 have	
assumed	 much	 lower	 profiles.	 In	 Benin,	 the	
Ministry	of	Agriculture	 showed	 little	 interest	
in	promoting	BFs	during	 the	development	 of	
the	 BF	 promotion	 strategy,	 and	 dedicated	
little	 resources	 to	 it:	 for	 example,	 BF	 plants	
are	 not	 listed	 among	 the	 thirteen	 priority	
areas	 in	 the	 strategic	 plan	 for	 the	 revival	 of	
the	agricultural	sector	 (PSRSA)	developed	by	
the	ministry	 in	 2011.	 In	 contrast,	 in	 Senegal	
the	 Jatropha	 and	 sugar	 cane	 sectors	 were	
defined	as	such	promising	sectors	in	the	Agro‐
Sylvo‐Pastoral	Act	(LOASP)	of	June	2004	that	
a	special	Jatropha	program	was	begun	by	the	
                                                            
10	 In	contrast,	 it	has	been	well	demonstrated	 in	France	
and	 Europe	 for	 oilseeds,	 and	 in	 Brazil	 for	 sugar	 cane,	
two	 countries/continents	 where	 BFs	 have	 been	
developed,	 that	 this	 energy	 outlet	 saved	 agricultural	
sectors	which	had	been	struggling	to	remain	profitable.	
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Ministry	 of	 Agriculture.	 However,	 today	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Energy	 is	 in	 control	 of	 the	 BF	
sector.	 In	 Burkina	 Faso,	 the	 weak	 to	 non‐
existent	 involvement	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Agriculture	 has	 been	 a	 major	 obstacle	
impeding	 the	development	of	 the	 sector	 (see	
below).	
Public	 actions	 and	 measures	 usually	
were	 implemented	 by	 the	 energy	 ministries	
and	 primarily	 concerned	 technical	 and	
economic	 innovations	 without	 considering	
social	 or	 agricultural	 objectives	 [11].	 In	 the	
four	countries,	the	energy	ministries	were	the	
ones	 steering	 the	 development	 of	 policy	 and	
strategy	documents	on	the	promotion	of	BFs.	
Furthermore,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 various	
national	 BF	 agencies	 and	 committees	 are	
under	the	energy	ministries	does	not	facilitate	
public	 coordination	 (see	 above).	While	 these	
concertation	 structures	 include	
representatives	 of	 several	 ministries	 (often	
the	ministries	of	agriculture,	the	environment,	
industry,	 research,	 and	 the	 economy),	 these	
other	ministries	play	much	less	active	roles	in	
the	 implementation	 of	 BF	 policies	 and	
strategies.	 Without	 real	 operational	
autonomy	 (with	 the	 exception	of	ANADEB	 in	
Mali),	 these	 structures	 are	 barely	 functional	
and	 are	 unable	 to	 establish	 a	 framework	 of	
concerted	 action	 between	 the	 different	
ministries	 involved.	 Policies	 and	 strategies	
demonstrate	 a	 clear	 intention	 to	 involve	 a	
large	number	of	public	bodies,	but	their	roles	
are	 not	 well	 defined,	 which	 renders	 policy	
implementation	difficult.		
	
2.2. From	weak	public	
coordination	to	the	emergence	
of	conflicts	
	
Within	 the	 public	 decision	 making	
sphere,	 without	 effective	 upstream	
coordination	 of	 public	 action,	 conflicts	 can	
emerge	 and	 block	 the	 development	 of	 the	
sector,	 in	particular	when	 the	BF	agencies	or	
committees	are	unable	to	ensure	concertation	
between	various	sector	stakeholders.		
In	 Benin,	 the	 conflict	 between	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Energy	 on	 one	 side,	 and	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Agriculture	 in	 coalition	 with	
farmer	 organizations	 on	 the	 other,	 blocked	
communications	between	 the	 two	ministries.	
The	 disagreement	 began	 over	 the	 use	 of	
cassava	 as	 raw	 material	 for	 bioethanol	
production.	 In	 Senegal,	 a	 conflict	 involving	 a	
land	acquisition	also	erupted	at	the	local	level	
following	 a	 misunderstanding	 between	 an	
Italian	 multinational	 located	 in	 the	 Fanaye	
region	 and	 farmer	 organizations	 allied	 with	
the	Ministry	of	Agriculture.	 	This	conflict	was	
highly	 publicized	 and	 led	 to	 a	 freeze	 of	 this	
multinational's	 activities	 following	
government	intervention	to	defuse	tension	in	
the	region	at	the	time.	Some	actors	remain	on	
guard.	
The	 case	 of	 Burkina	 Faso	 illustrates	
several	 types	 of	 conflicts.	 The	 Ministry	 of	
Agriculture	 remained	 quite	 remote	 from	 the	
development	process	of	the	sector.	According	
to	 public	 administration	 theory	 [20],	 this	
situation	 could	 be	 understood	 as	 an	
expression	of	a	conflict	of	views	and	interests,	
and	of	competition	between	actors.		
The	weak	coordination	of	public	action	
reflects	 a	 conflict	 of	 views	 and	 interests	
between	 the	 two	 ministries	 which	 has	 not	
been	 resolved.	 The	 Ministry	 of	 Energy	 is	
focused	 on	 energy	 issues	 (access	 to	 energy,	
reduction	 in	 the	 cost	 of	 hydrocarbon	
imports).	 Meanwhile,	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Agriculture,	 which	 oversees	 agricultural	 and	
rural	 development,	 is	 concerned	 about	 the	
food	security	of	family	farmers	and	land	risks,	
echoing	the	international	discourse	[3].		
Another	facet	of	this	weak	coordination	
of	public	action	is	a	personal	conflict	between	
a	 former	 Minister	 of	 Agriculture	 and	 a	
political	 go‐between,	 Larlé	 Naaba.	 	 This	 key	
player	 in	 the	 sector	 is	 widely	 known	 due	 to	
his	title	of	traditional	chief.		He	is	furthermore	
a	 deputy	 in	 the	 National	 Assembly	 and	 an	
economic	operator.	 In	2006,	he	began	a	 joint	
venture	 BF	 production	 project	 named	
“BelwetBiocarburant	 S.A.”.	 Due	 to	 his	
notoriety,	 his	 activities	 to	 promote	 Jatropha	
farming	 received	 considerable	 media	
attention,	to	the	point	that	he	became	known	
as	“Mr.	Jatropha”	in	Burkina	Faso.	Following	a	
visit	to	Larlé	Naaba’s	home	provinces,	and	on	
the	 occasion	 of	 a	 national	 day	 to	 promote	
Jatropha	 organized	 by	 Larlé	 Naaba	 in	 2008,	
the	 then	Minister	of	Agriculture	entered	 into	
direct	 conflict	 with	 the	 traditional	 chief	 and	
publically	 stated	 his	 personal	 opposition	 to	
the	promotion	of	 Jatropha,	which	 in	his	view	
would	 threaten	 food	 security.	 Larlé	 Naaba	
then	used	his	political	 network	 to	meet	with	
highly	 placed	 government	 officials	 to	 obtain	
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their	support	and	assurances,	and	to	continue	
his	Jatropha	production	project.	 In	December	
2008,	he	could	claim	to	have	received	a	letter	
of	 encouragement	 from	 the	 President	 of	 the	
Republic.	His	prominent	position	enabled	him	
to	 escort	 numerous	 national	 and	 foreign	
figures	on	visits	to	his	experimental	field	and	
to	 obtain	 bank	 credit	 to	 finance	 his	 project	
and,	more	 importantly,	 support	and	promote	
Jatropha	 farming	 in	 rural	 areas	 (seed	
donations,	awareness	raising	campaigns,	local	
and	 national	 media	 coverage).	 The	 minister	
criticized	 the	 traditional	 chief	 for	 using	 his	
prominent,	 highly	 publicized,	 and	 influential	
position,	 for	 relying	 on	 arguments	 mainly	
based	on	energy	independence,	and	the	quasi	
unilateral	development	of	BFs	by	the	Ministry	
of	 Energy.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 traditional	 chief	
reproached	 the	 minister	 for	 his	
“authoritarian”	 and	 personal	management	 of	
the	 issue	and	the	minimal	 involvement	of	his	
ministry.	 This	 situation	 contributed	 to	
blocking	 the	 BF	 dossier	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Agriculture,	 and	 explains	 in	 part	
the	 ministry’s	 limited	 involvement	 in	 the	
building	 of	 the	 policy	 and	 regulatory	
framework	 for	 the	 sector.	 The	 minister’s	
political	 weight	 (he	 was	 minister	 several	
times)	 explains	 his	 capacity	 to	 block	 the	
dossier	 from	 advancing	 on	 the	 government’s	
agenda.	 A	 lack	 of	 conclusive	 scientific	
research	 on	 the	 effects	 of	 BFs	 on	 food	
security,	 and	 above	 all	 the	 controversy	 over	
the	 impacts	 of	 BFs	 which	 emerged	 in	 2005,	
reinforced	 his	 position	 and	 that	 of	 his	
ministry.11	However,	since	being	out	of	office,	
the	 former	 minister	 and	 current	 deputy	 has	
confided	that,	with	the	benefit	of	hindsight,	he	
is	personally	in	favor	of	Jatropha	farming,	but	
only	 on	 arid	 land,	 and	 of	 the	 promotion	 of	
industrial	 value	 chains,	 which	 are	 the	 only	
ones	 he	 believes	 are	 likely	 to	 have	 a	
satisfactory	 impact	 on	 macro‐economic	
indicators.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 current	Minister	
of	 Agriculture	 has	 stated	 a	 clear	 intention	 to	
ensure	 food	 security	 and	 does	 not	 appear	 to	
have	changed	the	ministry’s	position.		
	
                                                            
11	Despite	some	scientific	research	findings	pointing	to	a	
positive	impact	on	food	crop	yields	when	food	crops	are	
cultivated	 in	 association	 with	 BF	 crops:	 studies	 and	
masters	thesis	supervised	by	Makido	Ouédraogo.		
Conclusion	
	
The	 emergence	 of	 BFs	 in	 the	 countries	
studied	 assumed	 various	 forms	 under	 the	
guiding	vision	of	different	actors	and	against	a	
backdrop	 of	 interplay	 between	 stakeholders.	
No	public	BF	policy,	meaning	an	ensemble	of	
coordinated	 actions	 implemented	 with	 the	
objective	 of	 obtaining	 a	 change	 in,	 or	 an	
evolution	 of,	 a	 given	 situation,	 exists	 today.	
This	 is	 what	 we	 have	 called	 a	 political	
vacuum.	 The	 development	 of	 BFs	 in	 Benin,	
Burkina	 Faso,	 and	 Senegal	 suffers	 in	
particular	 from	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 clear	 vision	
shared	 by	 all	 stakeholders	 and	 the	 lack	 of	
coordination	 between	 public	 actors.	 BF	
strategies	 were	 not	 created	 through	 a	
participatory	 process	 and	 have	 not	 led	 to	 an	
institutional	 environment	 that	 is	 both	
favorable	 to	 the	 sustainable	 development	 of	
the	BF	sector	and	respectful	of	the	interests	of	
family	 farmers,	 who	 form	 the	 majority	 in	
West	African	countries.	
Our	 analysis	 of	 the	 relationships	
between	 stakeholders	 using	 the	 “4C”	
framework	 presents	 complex	 relationships	
and	 varying	 degrees	 of	 stakeholder	
involvement	 depending	 on	 the	 country	 in	
question.	While	 concerted	 action	 has	 overall	
been	 very	 limited,	 it	 is	 taking	 place	 in	 Mali	
with	 an	 integrated	 process	 associating	
numerous	sector	stakeholders.	However,	one	
hesitates	 to	 speak	 of	 a	 success	 story	 in	 this	
country	when	numerous	challenges	still	need	
to	 be	 addressed	 (plant	 agronomy,	
competitiveness	 and	 organization	 of	 value	
chains,	 replacement	 of	 traditional	 fuels	 by	
BFs,	 etc.)	 before	 production	 can	 reach	 the	
level	 needed	 for	 BFs	 to	 assume	 a	 significant	
role	 in	 the	 national	 energy	 supply.	 In	 the	
other	 three	 countries,	 the	 national	 agencies	
and	 committees	 responsible	 for	 setting	 up	
frameworks	 for	 concerted	 action	 involving	
multiple	actors	to	develop	BF	policies	and	the	
structuring	 of	 the	 sector	 have	 functioned	
poorly.	 An	 institutional	 vacuum	 has	 taken	
hold	 which	 prevents	 investments	 in	 and	 the	
sustainable	development	of	the	BF	sector.		
Although	 public	 coordination	 appears	
to	 be	 a	 key	 step	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	
sector,	 the	 governments	 in	 these	 countries	
mainly	 worked	 through	 the	 ministries	 in	
charge	 of	 energy,	 which	 have	 become	 the	
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leaders	on	 the	BF	question.	Other	ministries,	
such	 as	 those	 of	 agriculture,	 or,	 to	 a	 lesser	
degree,	 the	 environment,	 economy	 and	
finance,	 trade	 and	 industry,	 have	 exercised	
little	 influence	 over	 the	 orientation	 and	
implementation	 of	 policies	 and	 strategies.	
National	 BF	 policies	 are	 thus	 primarily	
focused	 the	 energy	 potential	 of	 BFs	 and	 on	
technical	 and	 economic	 dimensions	 of	
processing	 Jatropha	 seeds	 into	 oil	 and	
biodiesel	 rather	 than	 on	 upstream	 and	
downstream	 social	 objectives.	 In	 Burkina	
Faso,	controversy	over	food	security	risks	and	
personal	 tensions	 and	 differences	 influenced	
the	position	of	some	key	players,	blocking	all	
possibility	 of	 public	 coordination	 and	 the	
establishment	of	a	favorable	environment	for	
the	 sector.	 Yet	 the	 question	 of	 the	 role	 of	
energy	 in	 rural	 development	 [5]	 [9]	 could	
have	 been	 the	 focus	 of	 coordinated,	
multisectoral	public	action.		
Moving	 beyond	 this	 institutional	
approach,	 it	 is	 also	 evident	 that	 the	
sustainability	of	BFs	in	West	African	countries	
is	heavily	subject	to	variations	in	the	price	of	
oil.		
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